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For me then this is the real problem with
quantum theory: the apparently essential con-
flict between any sharp formulation [of quan-
tum theory] and fundamental relativity. That
is to say, we have an apparent incompatibil-
ity, at the deepest level, between the two fun-
damental pillars of contemporary theory . . . .
It may be that a real synthesis of quantum and
relativity theories requires not just technical
developments but radical conceptual renewal.
J.S. Bell (1986, [4, p. 9])
I. INTRODUCTION
This white paper aims to identify an open problem in
‘Quantum Physics and the Nature of Reality’—namely
whether quantum theory and special relativity are for-
mally compatible—, to indicate what the underlying is-
sues are, and put forward ideas about how the problem
might be addressed.
———
Consider jointly the following two theorems: firstly, the
so-called No-Signalling Theorem in quantum theory1;
and, secondly, Bell’s Theorem stating that quantum the-
ory is not locally causal2. Then, do quantum theory and
the theory of (special) relativity indeed “peacefully coex-
ist” (A. Shimony, 1984 [29, p. 227]) or is there an “appar-
ent incompatibility” here (J.S. Bell, 1984 [5, p. 172])? If
we think the latter is the case—which we will argue one
should—, does this ask for a radical revision of our un-
derstanding of what (special) relativity in fact enforces?
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1 By quantum theory we mean non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics a` la von Neumann, where the projection postulate need not
necessarily be included.
2 Importantly, by Bell’s theorem we do not mean a violation of
a Bell-type inequality by quantum mechanical predictions, but
only a violation of the condition of Local Causality in quantum
mechanics. See section IIB.
Or are the requirements set by special relativity quite
well-understood and should we, therefore, either adopt
an un-relativistic approach in any future physics because
relativity is false, or, alternatively, find a new formulation
of quantum theory that manages to violate Bell’s local
causality in a relativistically invariant way? Or might it
be the case that a conclusive, and well-understood an-
swer to the central question can only be provided by a
quantum theory of gravity?
There is no consensus among contemporary philoso-
phers and physicists as to how one should answer these
questions. For example, Albert and Galchen (2009,
[1]) speak of a “quantum threat to special relativity”,
whereas Clark et al. (2010, [9]) claim that “[t]he formal
compatibility of quantum mechanics with special relativ-
ity is highly nontrivial and is in many ways miraculous.”
Is there indeed such a formal compatibility? If indeed so,
can we understand this “miracle”? Or should we agree
with Albert and Galchen that we are faced with a severe
incompatibility, and in such a way that relativity is likely
to be undermined?
In this white paper these issues will be addressed as
follows. The doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” between
relativity and quantum physics claims simply that rela-
tivity and quantum theory will never be found to con-
tradict each other in those cases in which they do hap-
pen to be talking about the same things—in particular
the types of causal correlations that are possible between
events. However, we believe it is fair to claim that no sat-
isfactory proof of this proposition has so far been offered.
The reason is the following. Peaceful coexistence is sup-
posed to be guarenteed by the so-called No-Signalling
Theorems. However, such theorems in fact presuppose
locality of measurements (i.e., a form of no-signalling)
and are therefore circular.
This is a first reason to question the doctrine of peace-
ful coexistence. But independent of whether one believes
this verdict of the no-signalling theorems to be appropri-
ate, it remains the fact that quantum theory is not locally
causal and thus violates the causal spacetime structure
of relativity. And because of this latter fact a very good
case can be made that there really is an incompatibility
here between quantum theory and special relativity. It
thus appears that instead of facing peaceful coexistence
we are in fact confronted with armed truce (Peacock,
1991 [25]).
Section II is devoted to a series of arguments in favour
of this position. Section III presents a number of ways
2to address this incompatibility between quantum theory
and special relativity. Here we will have to necessarily
be brief, both because of lack of space as well as because
most of these proposals are still work in progress and not
at all clear-cut. Section IV concludes via a short discus-
sion. Finally, the Appendix contains a careful exposition
of Bell’s notion of local causality.
II. ARTICULATING THE PROBLEM AND THE
UNDERLYING ISSUES
A. Why peaceful coexistence is not ensured
The claim has been made that the principles of quan-
tum theory alone suffice for proofs of the No-Signalling
Theorems [13, 14, 26]. The most sophisticated proofs
of these theorems are in term of quantum field theory
and rely on the notion of microcausality or local com-
mutativity, which means that operators which represent
measurements performed on space-like separate parts of
a physical system always commute, regardless of whether
or not they would commute if operating locally (Peacock,
1991 [25, p. 56]).
The important observation is that this microcausal-
ity condition does not follow from some set of quantum
principles, but is in fact postulated because it is “the
mathematical statement of the fact that no signal can be
exchanged between two points separated by a spacelike
interval and therefore that measurements at such points
cannot interfere” (Schweber, 1961 [27, p. 723]). Indeed,
Stapp (1988, [33, p. 88]) admits that “relativistic quan-
tum field theory . . . is constructed to ensure that its pre-
dictions do not depend either on the frame of reference or
upon the order in which one imagines performing mea-
surements on spacelike separated regions.”
However, “a proof of a result based on a theory which
was ‘constructed to ensure’ that result is no proof at
all” (Peacock, 1991 [25, p. 70]). This conclusion has
been endorsed recently by Mittlestaedt (2008, [19, p. 2]):
“The micro-causality condition of relativistic quantum
field theory excludes entanglement induced superluminal
signals but this condition is justified by the exclusion of
superluminal signals. Hence, we are confronted here with
a vicious circle, and the question whether there are su-
perluminal EPR-signals cannot be answered in this way.”
Other proofs of the No-Signalling Theorem not us-
ing the assumption of microcausality suffer from similar
problems because they either implicitly or explicitly as-
sume that measurements have only local effects, thereby
begging the question (Peacock, 1991 [25])3. Of course,
what these theorems do show is that the requirement of
3 It is noteworthy that Shimony himself abanded his idea of
“peaceful coexistence”, as he admits in (Shimony, 2004 [30]):
”The proposal of peaceful coexistence was in fact espoused at
one time by the present author (Shimony, 1978 [28, section V]),
no-signalling can be worked out consistently in the quan-
tum domain, and as such can be regarded ‘consistency
proofs’. Furthermore, logically, for the desired compat-
ibility between quantum theory and relativity it is not
needed that one can derive the no-signalling constraint,
or any other relativistic constraint whatsoever.
But despite this, even if the theorems would be valid,
then still the desired compatibility would not be ensured.
The reason is that it is highly questionable that special
relativity is inextricably bound up with the impossibility
of transmitting messages faster than the speed of light.
As for example Maudlin (2002, [18]) has shown, the com-
patibility of no-signalling and special relativity is much
more subtle than this. Special relativity is primarily a
theory about the geometrical structure of space and time.
And in fact, the truth of the theory is perfectly con-
sistent with theories that have tachyon mechanisms of
super-luminal transmission (Maudlin, 2002 [18]; Arntze-
nius, 1994 [2]; Berkovitz, 2007 [7]).
This raises questions about what exactly special rel-
ativity enforces, i.e., what the letter of relativity is as
opposed to its spirit. Although we do not want to iden-
tify special relativity with the demand for Lorent invari-
ance, we regard it as a particularly clear and uncontro-
versial part of the theory (Brown, 2005 [8]). With regard
to the possible correlations between outcomes of space-
like measurements in quantum theory, it is fair to claim
that, minimally, relativity asks for a Lorentz covariant
story on Minkowsky spacetime of how the correlations
arise. Is this possible? We will see that any attempt to
do so and that uses the causal structure implicit in the
Minkowskian spacetime faces great difficulty because of
Bell’s Theorem.
B. Quantum theory is not locally causal: a basic
inconsistency with relativity?
Bell’s condition of local causality is envisaged to encode
the Minkowsky spacetime structure for possible physi-
cal interactions and influences between physical systems.
See Appendix. As Norsen (2007, [21]; 2009, [22]) has
stressed, particularly noteworthy is the plausibility, gen-
erality, and evident appropriateness of Bell’s locality cri-
terion as an expression of the relativistic causal structure
of Fig. 1 (see Appendix). If we now assume that lawlike
prediction of correlations is indicative of a causal connec-
tion4, either directly or via a common cause, then a the-
ory’s violation of the criterion of local causality (thereby
but he was dissuaded from it by a powerful anti-anthropocentric
argument of John Bell”. (Shimony here refers to Section 6.12
of (Bell, 1990 [6]) where Bell argues that ‘no-signalling faster
than light’ cannot be the expression of the fundamental causal
structure of contemporary theoretical physics.)
4 Brown (2005 [8, Appendix B]) rejects this view so as to argue that
violations of local causality do not entail non-local causation. He
remarks: “Perhaps it is simply not the case that in quantum
3excluding common causes) means that it posits non-local
causation; and not mere non-local correlations. But it
should be noted that this not necessarily implies that it
supports super-luminal signalling.
As is well known, quantum theory violates local causal-
ity, i.e., the theory violates Eq. (2) of the Appendix. To
show this one takes the beable (or ‘hidden variable’) λ to
be some entangled quantum state ψ (or density matrix
ρ)5 and uses suitably chosen observables a and b. The
formal proof will not be rehearsed here. See for example
Bell (1976 [3], 1990 [6]), and many others6.
It is important to comment on some of the facts that
are commonly overlooked in obtaining the conclusion
that quantum theory violates local causality. Firstly, not
needed are Bell’s inequalities7. Secondly, not needed is
a ‘free will’ assumption whereby one assumes a form of
independence between λ and the settings a, b. Thirdly,
there is no need for an analysis of the ‘collapse of the
wavefunction’ as a real physical process.
It is a rather subtle question—see below—whether or
not special relativity genuinely requires local causality in
the sense of Fig. 1 of the Appendix (Maudlin, 2002, [18]).
However, “if one grants this (and virtually all physicists
and commentators do), then it really is possible to es-
tablish an “essential conflict between any sharp formu-
lation [of QM] and fundamental relativity. That is to
say, we have an apparent incompatibility, at the deepest
level, between the two fundamental pillars of contempo-
rary theory. . .” (Bell, 1984 [5, p. 172]).” (Norsen, 2009
[22]).
III. WAYS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM
Can quantum violations of local causality be reconciled
with relativity? One can generally distinguish two types
of approaches in resolving this issue, and which are not
necessarily mutually exclusive:
mechanics, correlations are always apt for causal explanation.”
(Brown, 2005 [8, Appendix B]). We believe this position to be
utterly unsatisfactory.
5 Indeed, for standard quantum mechanics λ is “already suffi-
ciently specified” [see second quote by Bell in the Appendix]
when the quantum state ψ is fully specified.
6 Muller (1999, [20]) stresses that no space-time formulation of
quantum mechanics is as of yet available—thus it can not be
regarded a spacetime theory—, and that it is a hard job to for-
mulate one, be it in Minkovskian or Galilean spacetime. How-
ever, despite being true, this is not relevant for the problem here.
All that is needed to consider the question of local causality are
predictions for measurement outcomes at certain space-time lo-
cations as in Fig. 3 (see Appendix), and quantum mechanics does
give such predictions when the measurements and the state to be
measured are specified. It does not matter that the theory itself
cannot be taken to be a spacetime theory on some appropriate
differentiable manifold.
7 Our conclusion is therefore safe from some common objections
against derivations of Bell-type inequalities (e.g., such as prob-
lems associated with the need for Kolmogorovian probability the-
ory when averaging over λ).
1. The approach depends (i) on the interpretation of
special relativity (i.e, a specific view on which con-
straints the theory in fact imposes), or (ii) on some
modification of this theory.
2. The approach depends on (i) a specific interpreta-
tion of quantum theory, or (ii) on somemodification
of it.
The approaches of the first type address the problem of
reconciling quantum theory with relativity by rejecting
that the principle of local causality is implied by relativ-
ity; those of the second type that quantum events and/or
quantum correlations are of a peculiar nature that just
cannot be straightforwardly imbedded into the spacetime
structure of Fig. 1 (Appendix).
In the following we will present a number of approaches
of both types, although it will by no means be an exhaus-
tive list:
(1) A fundamental assumption of the causal structure
of Fig. 1 (Appendix) is that measurements (i.e., the set-
tings and outcomes) can be associated with well-defined
finite regions in relativistic spacetime. This assumption
is needed so that we can assign to each measurement a
certain point (or region) in space and at a certain time.
One could choose to reject this assumption. But this has
far-reaching consequences: one can then no longer speak
of localized events, and it is unclear how one should pro-
ceed. Alternatively, perhaps we should adopt a strat-
egy where the wave function ceases to be a function on
spacetime and instead becomes a functional on the set of
spacelike hypersurfaces?
(2) We need perhaps revise our understanding of what
(special) relativity in fact enforces? As Maudlin (2002,
[18]) has stressed, we should distinguish between super-
luminal signals simpliciter and superluminal signals that
allow loops. And only the latter need give rise to in-
consistency with relativity. It thus seems that the only
fundamental relativistic constraint is that of Lorentz co-
variance (Brown, 2005, [8]). All talk of super-luminal
transmission, signalling, etc. appears to be besides the
point.
(3) We need perhaps adopt an unrelativistic approach
in any future physics because relativity has limited do-
main of applicability? Relativity could be only an emer-
gent theory from deeper level physics8, for example
through a holographic scenario (Verlinde, 2010 [36]) or
from a noncommutative geometrical theory which is non-
local with no space and no time in the usual sense, and
8 “It seems very likely that relativity, like all other classical the-
ories, will eventually be found to be an approximation to some
deeper and (stranger) quantum theory. [. . . ] I find it rather
surprising that so many authors have espoused the notion of
peaceful coexistence with such confidence. The whole trend in
physics in this century seems to rather obviously show that the
ultimate breakdown of ‘peaceful coexistence’ is exactly what we
should expect.” (Peacock, 1991 [25, p. 73]).
4that are to emerge only in the transition process to the
commutative case (Heller and Sasin, 1999 [16]).
(4) Or is it the case that the problem arises because
the current model of spacetime as a simple causal mani-
fold is inappropriate? The causal set approach by Sorkin
and collaborators (see e.g. (Sorkin, 2010, [32])) seems
to be promising in this respect. For them spacetime is
a discrete set of spacetime points partially ordered by
causal connectibility, which grows by a stochastic pro-
cess of adding points to the future of the given discrete
set; a causal set.
(5) Perhaps we can envisage a nonlocal ‘hidden’-
variable model that ’performs the trick’ (Gisin, 2009 [12])
via some non-local influence in spacetime? However, any
such attempt is seriously hindered by the fact that any
hypothetical nonlocal mechanism that procedures such
an influence must be very, very fast (the speed of trans-
mission should at least be four orders (!) of magnitude
faster than c (Salart et al., 2008 [23])). Furthermore, any
such a mechanism cannot employ covariant non-local hid-
den variables λ that are invariant under velocity-boosts
that changes the time order of events (Gisin, 2010 [10]).
The only viable option for a non-local mechanism is to
assume the existence of a preferred universal frame of ref-
erence which univocally determines the time ordering of
events. This seems to be a very unwelcome step to take,
but it is unclear whether the introduction of a dynami-
cally preferred frame would lead to a gross violation of
relativistic causality.
(6) Alternatively, should we find a new formulation
of quantum theory that manages to violate Bell’s local
causality in a relativistically invariant way? Could, for
example, Bohmian mechanics be made relativistically in-
variant? Or can we perhaps obtain some viable rela-
tivistically invariant generalisation of non-linear collapse
theories? Of the later type, the currently most promising
theory is announced by Tumulka (2006, [34, 35]) who has
provided a relativistically invariant dynamical reduction
model for many noninteracting fermions. It is interest-
ing in this regard to cite Tumulka (2006, [34]): “...we
seem to arrive at the following alternative: Bohmian me-
chanics shows that one can explain quantum mechanics,
exactly and completely, if one is willing to pay with us-
ing a preferred slicing of spacetime; our model suggests
that one should be able to avoid a preferred slicing if one
is willing to pay with a certain deviation from quantum
mechanics.”
(7) Should we adopt a new theory of time and of be-
coming? Gisin (2010, [10]) claims that “quantum events
are not merely the realization of usual probability dis-
tributions, but must be thought of as true acts of cre-
ation (true becoming)”, and in a related paper (2010,
[12, p. 1358]) he mentions: “To put the tension [between
quantum mechanics and relativity] in other words: no
story in spacetime can tell us how nonlocal correlations
happen, hence nonlocal quantum correlations seem to
emerge, somehow, from outside spacetime.”9 He con-
tinues (Gisin, 2010 [11]): “Note the implication for the
concept of time. Quantum events are not mere functions
of variables in space-time, but true creations: time does
not merely unfold, true becoming is at work. The accu-
mulation of creative events is the fabric of time.” Can
this indeed be worked out in a full-fledged and under-
standable theory of time and becoming that resolves our
problem?
(8) Or can we find solace by merely interpreting quan-
tum theory differently? In the Everett interpretation
of quantum theory the threat of non-locality is claimed
to be absent10: “[W]hen considering spacelike separated
measurements on an entangled system [. . . ] there is
no question of the obtaining of a determinate value for
one sub-system requiring that the distant system acquire
the corresponding determinate value, instead of another.
Both sets of anti-correlated values are realised (become
definite) relative to different observing states; there is,
as it were, no dash to ensure agreement between the two
sides to be a source of non-locality and potentially give
rise to problems with Lorentz covariance.” (Brown, 2005
[8, Appendix B]).
(9) Finally, a serious option to consider is that a con-
clusive, and well-understood answer to the central ques-
tion can only be provided by a (yet to be obtained) full-
fledged quantum theory of gravity. However, we find this
very unlikely, see next section.
IV. DISCUSSION
The main point of this white paper is to argue that a
good and fair case can be made that a basic inconsis-
tency exists between quantum theory and relativity; an
inconsistency that is not easily dealt with. Let us hope
that one day the basic inconsistency be illuminated, per-
haps harshly, by some new exciting physics. Allow me to
end this white paper with the following plea by Norsen
(2009, [22, p. 293]):
“If more physicists would only study Bell’s
papers instead of relying on dubious sec-
ondary reports, they would, I think, come
to appreciate that there really is here a se-
rious inconsistency to worry about. A much
higher-level inconsistency between quantum
theory and (general) relativity has been the
impetus, in recent decades, for enormous ef-
forts spent pursuing (what Bell once referred
to as) “presently fashionable ‘string theories’
of ‘everything’.” (1990, [6, p. 100]) How
9 It is unclear how we should understand the phrase ’happen’ here.
10 We believe, however, that this approach is beset with fundamen-
tal problems and its solution to the present problem to be far
from satisfactory.
5might a resolution of the more basic incon-
sistency identified by Bell shed light on (or
radically alter the motivation and context for)
attempts to quantize gravity? We can’t pos-
sibly know until (perhaps long after) we face
up squarely to Bells important insights.”
What is important here is not so much the appeal to
read Bell—although one is strongly advised to do so—
but that, instead of focussing on the higher-level incon-
sistency between quantum theory and general relativity,
it could very well be a better idea to first resolve the basic
inconsistency indicated here.
Thus, as indeed encountered so often, and here once
again, the most elementary might not be the easiest to
start with.
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APPENDIX: BELL’S NOTION OF LOCAL
CAUSALITY
This Appendix11 outlines Bell’s concept of local causality.
This is done very carefully because, firstly, there contin-
ues to be great misunderstanding among the commenta-
tors regarding the status of the concept, and, secondly,
so as to convince one of the “the plausibility, general-
ity, and evident appropriateness of Bells locality concept
as an expression of the relativistic causal structure . . . ”
(Norsen [21, p. 15]).
———
In the section entitled ‘Principle of local causality’ of the
very last article Bell wrote on the foundations of quan-
tum theory (published in 1990 and entitled ’La Nouvelle
Cuisine’ [6]), Bell begins his explanation of the princi-
ple of local causality as defining the causal structure of
relativity as follows:12
“The direct causes (and effects) of events are near
by, and even the indirect causes (and effects) are
no further away than permitted by the velocity
of light.” Bell (1990) [6, p. 105]
11 This Appendix is taken from Seevinck and Uffink (2010, [31]),
but also see Norsen (2007, [21]; 2009, [22]).
12 Here we will mainly focus on Bell’s formulation of this principle
as presented in ’La Nouvelle Cuisine’, Bell (1990) [6]. This pre-
sentation we take to be the most definite and precise one Bell
ever presented; it is overall consistent with earlier formulations
Bell used to indicate this principle. See Norsen (2007) [21] for
further elaboration and support of this claim.
1
effects
causes
FIG. 1. “Space-time location of causes and effects of events in
region 1.” Figure (slightly modified) and caption taken from
Bell (1990 [6, p. 105]).
This locates the causes operating in a certain region
in spacetime in the backward light cone of that region
and effects of anything occuring in that region in its for-
ward light cone. See Fig. 1. But Bell remarks, “[t]he
above principle is not yet sufficiently sharp and clean for
mathematics”. He then continues (see Fig. 2):
“A theory is said to be locally causal if the prob-
abilities attached to values of local beables in a
space-time region 1 are unaltered by a specifi-
cation of values of local beables in a space-like
separated region 2 when what happens in the
backward light cone is already sufficiently spec-
ified, for example by a full specification of local
beables in a spacetime region 3. It is important
that region 3 completely shields off from 1 the
overlap of the backward light cones of 1 and 2.
And it is important that events 3 be specified
completely. Otherwise the traces in region 2 of
causes of events in 1 could well supplement what-
ever else was being used for calculating probabil-
ities about 1. The hypothesis is that any such
information about 2 becomes redundant when 3
is specified completely.” Bell (1990) [6, p. 106]
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FIG. 2. “Full specification of what happens in 3 makes events
in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1 in a locally causal the-
ory.” Figure and caption taken from Bell (1990) [6, p. 105].
Although this formulation is considerably sharper, it
is not yet cleanly formulated in terms of mathematics.
Probably for this reason Bell introduces some further no-
tation and terminology in a subsequent discussion. He in
effect introduces the space-time diagram of Fig. 3 that
7is adapted from Norsen’s (2009) [22] highly illuminating
paper.
b
a
BA
λ
1 2
3b3a
FIG. 3. Space-time diagram of the setup Bell considers. For
explanation, see text. Figure adapted from Norsen (2009)
[22].
This diagram encodes the setup Bell considers. It in-
volves measurement on a bi-partite system (e.g., two par-
ticles emitted by a source) where each part is measured
by a different party, conventionally called Alice and Bob
respectively. The outcomes of measurement are repre-
sented by beables A (in region 1) and B (in region 2)
and the settings chosen by experimenters Alice and Bob
are denoted by beables a and b respectively. The symbol
λ indicates the specification of the state of the bipartite
system under study together with other relevant beables
in the spacetime regions 3a and 3b.
The logic is now as follows. Consider a candidate the-
ory that attempts to describe any correlations found be-
tween outcomes A and B. Suppose region 3a shields off
region 1 from the overlap of the past light cones of 1 and
2, and, likewise, that region 3b shields off region 2 from
the overlap of the past light cones of 1 and 2 (see Fig. 3).
It is assumed that (in this candidate theory under study)
λ constitutes a complete specification of the beables in
region 3a and 3b.
With all this implicitly in place, Bell continues and
applies his principle of local causality to this setup:
“Invoking local causality, and the assumed com-
pleteness of . . .λ . . . we declare redundant certain
of the conditional variables in the last expression
because they are at space-like separation from the
result in question.” Bell (1990)[6, p. 109]
Thus the specification of λmakes bothB and b redundant
for prediction about A, and both A and a redundant for
prediction about B.
This finally allows for a clean formulation in mathe-
matics of the principle. We follow Norsen (2007) [21] in
claiming that this indeed gives
Pa,b(A|B, λ) = Pa(A|λ) ,
Pa,b(B|A, λ) = Pb(B|λ) ,
(1)
i.e., the conditional probability13 of obtaining A is inde-
pendent of both B and b given the specification λ and
a, and analogous for the probability of obtaining B. Us-
ing the definition of conditional probability one trivially
obtains the condition
Pa,b(A,B|λ) = Pa(A|λ)Pb(B|λ) , (2)
i.e., the joint probability for obtaining outcomes A and
B factorizes into a product of individual probabilities
for the two spatially separated systems, with each fac-
tor containing conditionalization only on local beables.
This well-known factorisation condition is thus derived
from the principle of local causality, just as Bell himself
stressed14.
13 Note that the settings a, b are indices that label the different
conditional probabilities, whereas the outcomes A,B and λ are
random variables that can be conditioned on. See Seevinck and
Uffink (2010, [31]) for a detailed argument of why this is the
appropriate notation, instead of the more common formulation
where one also conditions on the settings and thus writes expres-
sions like P (A,B|a, b, λ) and not Pa,b(A,B|λ) as is done here.
14 “Very often such factorizability is taken as the starting point
of the analysis. Here we have preferred to see it not as the
formulation of “local causality”, but as a consequence thereof.”
Bell (1990) [6, p. 109]
